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CRIMINAL LAW
USING GROUP STATISTICS TO SENTENCE
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINALS: AN ETHICAL
AND STATISTICAL CRITIQUE OF THE
VIRGINIA RISK ASSESSMENT PROGRAM
BRIAN NETTER*
Virginia's program of nonviolent offender risk assessment uses predictions
of recidivism to recommend which felons should be incarcerated. Unlike
many sentencing schemes that rely upon the severity of the offense and the
offender's criminal history, Viginia's depends on a statistical study
commissioned by the legislature that purports to match offender
characteristics with future behavior. New offenders are given recidivism
"scores" that depend on gender, employment status, marital status, and
age-all factors seemingly unrelated to the criminal conduct itself This
Essay criticizes the Virginia approach as ethically suspect and
mathematically unsound and calls for greater public discourse as to the
hidden assumptions underlying the sentencing apparatus.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an ideal crime-fighting world, we would know every convict's
criminal proclivities. An offender could be detained for precisely the right
amount of time as we effortlessly balanced the many competing interests
served by our system of criminal justice. Of course, such a system would,
of necessity, require invasions of civil liberties that even the toughest on
crime might deem unreasonable.' Thus, our myriad schemes for criminal
J.D., Yale Law School; B.S.E., M.S.E., University of Michigan. Thanks to Michael
Maltz, Richard Kern, Nancy Gertner, Stephen Pollock, Doug Kysar, Kate Stith, Jed
Rubenfeld, Wendy Netter Epstein, and Karen Dunn.
1 See Norval Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, 6 CRIME & JUST. 1, 1
(1985) ("The use of predictions of dangerousness requires a political judgment balancing the
risk and harm to society with the intrusion on the liberty of each member of a preventatively
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sentencing rely upon proxies to estimate how best to achieve the goals of
"deterring crime, incapacitating the offender, providing just punishment,
and rehabilitating the offender."
2
To enhance these proxies, considerable efforts have been devoted to
developing tools to predict criminal behavior and criminological trends.3
But these efforts fall far short of predictive accuracy. In light of these
failings, there is a threshold ethical dilemma that we seldom consider: how
good must predictive efforts be to justify using them to take restrictive
actions that implicate the liberties of others?
The Commonwealth of Virginia sits at the forefront of predictive
techniques. Anticipating that prison space would become scarce after
implementing a truth-in-sentencing initiative to extend sentences for violent
crime, Virginia has spent a decade studying how to use its prison space
efficiently to reduce future crime. The goal has been to divide nonviolent
criminal offenders into groups-those deemed most likely to recidivate are
imprisoned while those assessed to pose less of a threat to society are given
alternative sanctions.4 On its face, such a program seems pedestrian and
detained group."). To state this predicament in more mathematical terms, "[a] defendant's
fight not to be a false positive must be balanced against the public's right not to be set on by
a false negative." Don M. Gottfredson, Prediction and Classification in Criminal Justice
Decision Making, 9 CRIME & JUST. 1, 13 (1987). In pop culture, this theme served as the
basis for the blockbuster MINORITY REPORT (Cruise/Wagner Prods. et. al. 2002), which
explored the consequences of burying false negatives in pursuit of a world without murder.
A direct connection was drawn between Virginia's risk assessment program and Minority
Report in Emily Bazelon, Sentencing by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2005, § 6
(Magazine), at 18. See also infra Part III.A.2.
2 U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ IA. 1 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2006guid/gl2006.pdf.
3 For example, the City of Chicago has recently launched a network of citywide
surveillance cameras to alert the police to suspicious activities on the streets. See Andrew
Buchanan, On Chicago Streets, Cameras Are Watching, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 30,
2003, at 1. Also, behavioral geneticists have worked to determine what biological indicators
signal a predisposition to criminality. See, e.g., Erik Stokstad, Psychology: Violent Effects of
Abuse Tied to Gene, 297 ScI. 752 (2002) (summarizing the results of research that a certain
genetic characteristic leads men to be more violent if they were abused as children);
Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children,
297 ScI. 851 (2002) (finding that the likelihood a maltreated child will develop antisocial
behavior depends on gene characteristics).
4 In Virginia, alternative sanctions include release with intensive supervision, home
electronic and telephonic monitoring, day reporting, boot camp, diversion centers, detention
centers, and additional local sanctions. BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA 20-22 (2002). The vast majority of
diverted offenders are sentenced to supervised probation. VA. CRIM. SENT'G COMM'N, 2003
ANNUAL REPORT 69 fig.46 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 ANNUAL REPORT] (showing sentence of
supervised probation for 80.6% of diverted offenders).
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unremarkable. After all, judges routinely make determinations about
offender riskiness during sentencing hearings. 5 But Virginia chose not to
rely on the expertise of judges for this initiative; instead, the
Commonwealth commissioned a risk-assessment tool, based on a statistical
study of recidivism, to make an initial division between the dangerous
destined for prison and those others who could be welcomed back into
society without visiting the state penitentiary. The system relies upon
simple worksheets that tally demerits for past crimes with additional
penalties for demographic characteristics found to be correlated with the
commission of crime. Thus, a young, unemployed, never-married man is
considerably more likely to face jail time than an older, divorced woman
who held a job prior to committing an identical crime.
The Virginia risk assessment program presents serious issues
regarding the ethical propriety of predictive techniques in criminal
sentencing. An evaluation of the program forces us to ask what classes of
information we are comfortable considering when penalizing criminal
misdeeds. Our answers to these questions are influenced-at least in part-
by the effectiveness of predictive techniques and the hidden assumptions
that govern their conclusions.6
This Essay evaluates Virginia's risk assessment program as a means to
probe our (dis)comfort with the use of predictive group statistics on
individual criminals and to determine whether the statistical techniques
adopted in Virginia are suitable for this important task. Part II gives the
history of risk assessment in Virginia. Part III discusses the ethics of
predictive sentencing of this sort. Part IV critiques the methodology of
Virginia's approach and the errors that are introduced therein. Part V
concludes the analysis.
5 See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) ("[A]ny sentencing authority must
predict a convicted person's probable future conduct when it engages in the process of
determining what punishment to impose."). This judicial competency can be seen in related
contexts as well. In determining whether mental health sufferers should be incapacitated
after criminal sentences have lapsed, the Supreme Court has found that the expected
dangerousness of the detainee must be considered. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354,
363-66, 368-69 (1983); see also Mark H. Moore, Purblind Justice: Normative Issues in the
Use of Prediction in the Criminal Justice System, in 2 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER
CRIMINALS" 314, 314 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1986) (noting that judges must frequently
confront risk in the context of bail hearings); Leslie T. Wilkins, The Politics of Prediction, in
PREDICTION IN CRIMINOLOGY 34, 35 (David P. Farrington & Roger Tarling eds., 1985) ("It
may seem absurd to ask whether human behavior should be predicted, because all persons
predict the behavior of others all the time.").
6 As Leslie Wilkins aptly observed, "[i]n the development of prediction instruments it is
necessary, but not sufficient, to seek the most efficient set of equations." Wilkins, supra
note 5, at 49.
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II. THE PATH TO RISK ASSESSMENT [N VIRGINIA
Virginia's experimentation with actuarial risk assessment in criminal
justice has been marked by incremental change and paced implementation.
The project began in earnest in 1994, when the General Assembly created
the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission (VCSC or Commission) and
instructed it to study the feasibility of placing twenty-five percent of
nonviolent felons into alternative arrangements by determining who among
the newly convicted posed the smallest risk to society.7
This initiative was a direct consequence of Virginia's truth-in-
sentencing reforms. After George Allen won the 1993 gubernatorial race
largely by promising to eliminate parole and to increase penalties for
violent crime, a commission recommended the widespread redrafting of
Virginia's criminal statutes.8 Unsurprisingly, with violent criminals serving
as little as twenty-nine percent of their sentences for crimes as serious as
first-degree murder, 9 there was pressure from both the public and
Congress'0 to keep violent criminals behind bars for longer terms. Under
Virginia's truth-in-sentencing program, violent convicts must serve at least
eighty-five percent of their sentences, and in the first decade of the
program, the average criminal served fully ninety percent." Over that same
decade, from 1994 to 2003, Virginia lowered its incidence of murder by
twenty-eight percent. 12
While implementing truth-in-sentencing, Virginia was understandably
concerned that increased prison sentences would lead to widespread prison
overcrowding. In light of their instincts "[t]o reserve the most expensive
resources for the most dangerous offenders, reformers underscored the
importance of making the most efficient use of the state's remaining
correctional resources to punish nonviolent offenders." 13  The newly-
7OSTROM ET AL., supra note 4, at 9 n.1; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 17-235(5) (1995),
amended by VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-803(5) (2006).
8 See BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING IN
VIRGINIA 4 (1999).
9 Id. at 28 (reporting statistics for 1988-1992).
10 Under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, tit. II, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13703 (2000)), truth-in-sentencing
incentive grants were made available for states in which violent offenders would serve at
least eighty-five percent of their sentences. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 8, at 5.
11 VA. CRIM. SENT'G COMM'N, A DECADE OF TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING IN VIRGINIA, No. 1
(2004), available at http://www.vcsc.state.va.us/ReptCdPDFfinal.pdf.
12 Id. at No. 8. Of course, this statistic does not establish causation.
13 VA. CRIM. SENT'G COMM'N, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 44-45 (2004) [hereinafter 2004
ANNUAL REPORT].
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created VCSC's charge, then, was to find ways to keep unlikely recidivists
out of the system.
It bears mentioning, however, that this utilitarian-driven initiative
conflicts with the underpinnings of truth-in-sentencing. The latter-also
adopted by the federal government and several other states4--springs from
a notion of "just deserts."' 5 Violent sentences were increased and judicial
discretion was largely curtailed under the theory that imprisonment is a
"deserved punishment rather than ... a means for rehabilitation and
treatment.' 16 Conversely, the risk assessment pilot was grounded in a
different, utilitarian theory of criminal law. It focused neither on punishing
the guilty nor on rehabilitating the rehabilitatable. Rather, the question
presented to the VCSC was the following: "Which nonviolent felony
offenders are at a low risk of re-offending and can thus be safely placed in
alternative sanction programs?"17 -i.e., how can sentencing procedures be
designed efficiently to protect the public-at-large?
In developing its approach, Virginia confronted a number of initial
decisions; namely, whether to conduct risk assessment or needs assessment
and whether to rely upon clinical risk assessment or statistical risk
assessment.
In deciding between risk assessment and needs assessment, Virginia
selected the former. The differences are meaningful. Risk assessment
determines sentencing based only on the probability that a criminal will
recidivate.' 8 Although there is considerable disunity as to the definition of
recidivism,' 9 this approach focuses on the public and its instrumental
interest in avoiding crime. Needs assessment, on the other hand,
emphasizes an individual offender's need for services, so the potential
effectiveness of treatment, counseling, or structured confinement can be
incorporated into -penal decisionmaking.2 0 The VCSC, interpreting its
mandate as limited to the "risk to public safety," chose to conduct only risk
assessment. 2' Thus, the tool ultimately developed by the VCSC makes only
a binary determination as to whether an offender should be sentenced to
confinement in the penitentiary or whether some unspecified form of
14 See PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., TRUTH IN
SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS (1999).
15 OSTROM ET AL., supra note 8, at 5; see also infra Part 1II.
16 Id.; see also ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS
(1976).
17 OSTROM ET AL., supra note 4, at 10.
18 Id. at 43-44.
19 See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
20 OSTROM ET AL., supra note 4, at 43-44.
21 Id. at 43.
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alternative sanction is objectively warranted.2  The subjective
determination of how best to accommodate eligible offenders' needs is
made by judges and/or probation officers without any reference to
statistics.
23
Despite the preference for clinical judgment in deciding between
alternative sanctions, Virginia chose to implement statistical risk
assessment to determine whether alternative sanctions would be
recommended. Clinical models rely upon intuition and discretion often left
in the hands of judges or medical professionals.24 Conversely, statistical
classification relies upon actuarial techniques to objectify the risks of future
misconduct.25 Inevitably, actuarial models cause individuals to suffer the
consequences of the groups to which they belong. Nonetheless, various
studies have found that actuarial methods can achieve better results than
their clinical counterparts.26 The Virginia legislature mandated a statistical
approach 27 and the VCSC followed course.
In pursuit of the legislated goal, the VCSC studied a random sample of
roughly 1500 fraud, larceny and drug offenders who had each been
incarcerated and released between July 1, 1991, and December 31, 1992.28
The Commission tracked these subjects and tallied who among them was
reconvicted for another felony within three years of initial release by
mining data in a Pre/Post-Sentence Investigation Database.29 Using
multivariate logistic regression to study the correlation between personal
characteristics and recidivism among those eligible for risk assessment,3 °
22 Id. at 3-4, 36-38, 42.
23 Id.; see also 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 42, 66.
24 OSTROM ET AL., supra note 4, at 28.
25 Id. Actuarial techniques are commonplace in society; they form "the basis of all
insurance and of a great many of our efforts to share and shift risk in the community."
Morris & Miller, supra note 1, at 14. On the differences between clinical and statistical
predictions generally, see THOMAS GABOR, THE PREDICTION OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR:
STATISTICAL APPROACHES (1986).
26 See Stephen D. Gottfredson & Don M. Gottfredson, Accuracy of Prediction Models, in
2 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS," supra note 5, at 247 ("[I1n virtually every
decision-making situation for which the issue has been studied, it has been found that
statistically developed predictive devices outperform human judgment."); Morris & Miller,
supra note 1, at 1. Note that this objective correlation does not speak to the ethicality of this
guilt by association.
27 See supra note 7 and accompanying text,
28 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 65.
29 id.
30 Eligibility for risk assessment was limited to fraud and larceny offenders and drug
offenders except those convicted for selling an ounce or more of cocaine. See OSTROM ET
AL., supra note 4, at 15 & n.4.
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the Commission developed a worksheet incorporating eleven factors and
their expected contributions to recidivist tendencies.
Figure 1






3. Offender marital status
4. Offender employment status
Current Offense Information:
5. Whether the offender acted alone when committing the crime
6. Whether there were additional offenses at conviction
Prior Adult Criminal Record:
7. Whether the offender had been arrested or confined within the past
12 months
8. Offender's prior criminal record
9. Whether the offender had prior drug felony convictions
10. Whether the offender had been incarcerated as an adult
Prior Juvenile Record:
11. Whether the offender had been incarcerated as a juvenile
The Commission's study revealed that race was statistically significant
but chose to omit this variable from the set of predictors because "the
Commission viewed race as a proxy for social and economic
disadvantage. 32
The risk assessment worksheet is a mandatory component of
sentencing for nonviolent offenders. Judges, however, have discretion to
deviate from the recommendations by "stat[ing] in writing the reason for
the departure., 33 In 2004, eighty-one percent of sentences conformed to the
worksheet recommendation, with the deviations roughly split between
31 Id. at 27; see also, e.g., id. at 123 (providing the risk assessment worksheet for fraud).
Note that these factors were amended after a validation study. See infra Part IV.B.2.
32 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 65-66.
33 See 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 46.
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upward and downward adjustments.34 The program began as a voluntary
pilot in scattered judicial circuits across Virginia; after judges were
interviewed, the Commission conducted a validation study to test and refine
the risk assessment instrument in 2001.3 The revised instrument was then
implemented statewide in 2002, with those offenders scoring thirty-five
points or fewer on the worksheet receiving a favorable recommendation.36
The threshold point level for favorable recommendations was raised to
thirty-eight in July 2004.37
III. ETHICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
Classification and prediction methods must rest on a basis in science, but they must be
applied in a world of values.
38
Virginia's novel venture into risk-based sentencing lies at the
intersection of a variety of thorny ethical issues. This nexus is unsurprising,
as "[p]eople have been arguing about the justifications for punishment and
for the criminal law for thousands of years. 39  These issues remain
unresolved and this Essay will not present a definitive solution. However,
when assessing a legislative mandate such as this, it is prudent to consider
the relevant reference points in the philosophical debate.
Part III examines four of the significant ethical issues raised by
offender risk assessment. Section A looks at the appropriateness of
punishing on the basis of hypothesized future crime. Section B considers
the significance of saddling individuals with the burdens of generalizations
on the groups to which they belong. Section C addresses the feedback
effects that differential sentencing could have on criminal deterrence,
leading to moral hazard. Section D questions whether the fundamentality
of the prison/no-prison decision affects our conclusions.
A. PUNISHING FOR FUTURE CRIME
In our criminal justice system, defendants are presumed innocent until
proven guilty and have a fundamental right to hold the state to its high
34 See id. at 47.
35 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 66-67; see also VA. CRIM. SENT'G COMM'N,
2001 ANNUAL REPORT 55-61 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 ANNUAL REPORT] (announcing the
results of the validation study).
36 See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 1.
37 Id.; see also 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 74 (recommending the change).
38 Gottfredson, supra note 1, at 13.
39 Michael Tonry, Prediction and Classification: Legal and Ethical Issues, 9 CRIME &
JusT. 367, 368 (1987).
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burden of proof.40 Under Virginia's program of offender risk assessment,
conclusions must be drawn about future behavior. These trends are
speculative at best, so proof beyond a reasonable doubt is, in this context,
unattainable. 4' The question of whether it is proper to attach penalties to
such unprovable conduct goes to the most foundational postulates of
criminal law and to the distinction between utilitarian and deontological
considerations.42
The risk assessment program can be justified only if base utilitarianism
is appropriate in the sentencing context. To further address the issue, this
section is divided into four subsections. Subsection 1 presumes,
counterfactually, that our predictive capabilities are perfect and questions
whether predictive techniques are prima facie defensible. Subsection 2
introduces the inevitability of error and examines the consequences.
Subsection 3 looks at whether the retributive underpinnings of Virginia's
truth-in-sentencing can be reconciled with the utilitarian nature of statistical
risk assessment. Subsection 4 questions whether it is problematic that the
selection biases that drive criminal law enforcement carry through to
sentencing.
1. Theories of Criminal Punishment
The goals of our correctional system are many. These goals relate to
offenders, society, and the constraints of the correctional institutions.43
Most criminal sanctions reflect a need to balance these constituencies, 44 but
in the case of prediction, such balancing is tricky as two key theories come
into conflict. Do we punish because criminals ought to receive their "just
deserts" or because they are cogs in a system designed to minimize dangers
to society? Virginia's approach is defensible only under the latter.45
40 See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301-02 (2004); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 357, 361-62 (1970).
41 See Tonry, supra note 39, at 391-97.
42 See generally Moore, supra note 5; Tonry, supra note 39.
43 MICHAEL D. MALTZ, RECIDIVISM 8-19 (1984).
44 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) (setting out the "[f]actors to be considered in
imposing a sentence," notably including both "the need for the sentence imposed ... to
reflect the seriousness of the offense" and "the need ... to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant").





Under a retributivist, or "just deserts," theory of punishment, the
criminal law acts to enforce moral norms; any deterrence is incidental.46
The strictest versions of retributivism, attributable to Kant and Hegel,
would allow nothing more than the details of the instant crime to be used in
determining the instant sentence.47 Once an offender repaid his debt to
society, he would regain equality with non-offending citizens.
Retributivist theory has a number of powerful virtues. Punishments
qualify as both horizontally equitable-similar crimes are punished
similarly-and vertically equitable-more serious crimes are punished
more harshly.48 In addition, retributivist punishments are predictable, so we
can see ourselves merely as doling out the consequences that informed
criminals knew would attach to their wrongful acts.49  This makes
deterrence easier to calibrate.
Notwithstanding these attributes, few scholars find strict retributivism
workable. Even the leading scholar of "just deserts" punishment, Andrew
Von Hirsch, agrees that prior bad acts are relevant because this use of past
data still represents "a deserved penalty based on the seriousness of his past
criminal conduct., 50 Von Hirsch and others would draw a line between past
bad acts and predicted future misconduct. 51 But this distinction does not
survive a quick test for philosophical consistency. If a misdeed is supposed
to carry a certain penalty, why should it have any force if an ex-convict
recidivates after the penalty has been paid? Some scholars contend that the
principal reason for incorporating past acts is because repeat offense is a
powerful predictor of career criminality.52 This, no doubt, is true, but
making this predictive judgment seriously weakens the distinction between
morals-based and consequentialist punishment.
46 Stephen D. Gottfredson & Don M. Gottfredson, Selective Incapacitation?, 478
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 135, 137 (1985). In fact, retributivism may be the only
theory of punishment for which prediction is not relevant.
47 Wilkins, supra note 5, at 45; see also 1 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS,"
supra note 5, at 8.
48 See I CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS," supra note 5, at 77-83.
49 See Moore, supra note 5, at 319.
50 Von Hirsch, supra note 16, at 98-100.
51 See, e.g., PETER W. GREENWOOD WITH ALLAN ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE
INCAPACITATION ix (1982) ("One could argue that 'deserts' is the predominant basis for
current sentencing decisions.").
52 See Wilkins, supra note 5, at 45.
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b. Utilitarianism
Utilitarian theory takes a pragmatic approach to punishment. A
criminal should be punished consistent with the extent to which future
crime will be prevented. At the extreme, a strict utilitarian would find no
justification for punishing a criminal at all if that punishment would not
prevent subsequent crimes.53 In the context of Virginia's risk assessment
program, utilitarianists would have no problem designing sentences with
reference to future impacts of correctional decisions.
In the context of prediction of future behavior, there are two utilitarian
approaches that merit discussion: selective incapacitation and selective
deinstitutionalization. Using either theory to assess Virginia's action results
in the same critique but for different reasons.
"Selective incapacitation" refers to "sentencing policies that attempt to
distinguish between higher-rate and lower-rate criminal offenders in
determining who will be incarcerated and for how long.",54 Proponents of
this approach presuppose that the goal of criminal justice is to maximize
"incapacitation effects"-defined as "those crimes prevented while
offenders are incarcerated"-subject to capacity constraints.55  Choosing
which subjects to incarcerate and which to set free based on a consideration
of all statistically relevant factors allows for better results. Advocates
dismiss retributivist theory as quaint but impractical because we have
always made such judgments: "[M]en serve longer terms than women... ;
defendants with prior records are more likely to be incarcerated than those
without.... We are simply offering a more rational method for
distinguishing among offenders. 56  Thus, as Reagan Administration
53 Tonry, supra note 39, at 386. Of course, it would be a rare circumstance in which a
serious crime would be best left unpunished. Even if a criminal is certain never to commit
another crime, there are second-order deterrence effects on bystanders who may be
considering similar offenses. However, "[t]he lack of relationship between crime
seriousness and risk of future crime has ominous significance for corrections
policymakers.... It is possible to optimize either just deserts or crime control, but not both
simultaneously." Todd Clear, Statistical Prediction in Corrections, 1 RES. IN CORRECTIONS
1,6(1988).
5 GREENWOOD WITH ABRAHAMSE, supra note 51, at 27.
I d. at x, 29.
56 Id. at 29-30. James Q. Wilson has been similarly skeptical of this retributivist
argument:
It is not enough to say, in opposition to selective capacitation, that it involves predicting
behavior, as if that were intolerable and never done. The entire criminal justice system is shot
through at every stage (bail, probation, sentencing, and parole) with efforts at prediction, and
necessarily so; if we did not try to predict, we would release on bail or on probation either many
more or many fewer persons, and make some sentences either much longer or much shorter.
JAMES Q. WILSON, CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 279 (1983).
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National Institute of Justice Chief James Stewart maintained, "'[t]he most
effective way to treat these criminals[] . . . is to put them in prison for the
likely length of their criminal careers.'" ' 57  Critics complain that this
approach can never be sufficiently accurate 58 and that punishment should
not depend on characteristics that are unrelated to the blameworthiness of
the offender.5 9
Whereas selective incapacitation deals with the initial decision of
whether to incarcerate, selective deinstitutionalization does not. The latter
approach, advanced by Gottfredson and Gottfredson, supports the use of
risk-based analysis only when, for reasons of overcrowding or emergency,
offenders who are already serving their sentences must be released. 60 The
authors find a "fundamental difference" between Greenwood's selective
incapacitation approach and their own method. 61  To be sure, selective
deinstitutionalization never results in the heightening of sentences beyond
their original deserts-based ideal; this approach 6laims merely to be a
concession to necessity.
Other utilitarian scholars have found a middle ground-supporting the
use of risk assessment to mitigate but not to aggravate sentences.62 Perhaps
this approach can be seen as allowing a deserts theory to make the first
estimate of the proper sentence, but then authorizing downward adjustments
in the name of mercy.63
In any case, the distinction between selective incapacitation and
selective deinstitutionalization is not altogether meaningful in evaluating
Virginia's sentencing apparatus. By setting an initial twenty-five percent
threshold, Virginia created a zero-sum game. One offender's reprieve can
come only at the expense of another inmate's incarceration. By setting this
fixed target, alternative sanctions are less a prize and more a competition
invoking all applicable principles of equity and liberty.
57 Key to Criminals'Futures: Their Pasts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 18, 1982, at
17.
58 See infra Part III.A.2.
59 See Gottfredson & Gottfredson, supra note 46, at 142.
60 Id. at 147-49.
61 Id. at 149.
62 Morris & Miller, supra note 1, at 6.
63 Id. at 4 ("A merciful and just system of punishment presupposes leniency toward those
who least threaten social injury; and this, in turn, inexorably involves predictions of
dangerousness."); see also Jackson v. State, 329 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1983); State v. Magnan,
327 N.W.2d 147 (Minn. 1983) (proscribing the use of predictions of future dangerousness to
impose lengthier prison sentences than Minnesota's sentencing guidelines would otherwise
prescribe).
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2. The Problem of Error
Even if predictive techniques were perfect, there would be moral
questions about their propriety. Yet the reality of risk-based assessment is
that it involves considerable error.64 The error comes in two varieties: false
positives and false negatives. In this context, a false positive is a person
predicted to recidivate who is therefore incarcerated but, in reality, would
have stayed crime-free. The false positive, then, spends time in prison that
may be considered undeserved or at least inefficient. False negatives,
conversely, are offenders predicted not to recidivate who do re-offend.6 5
Society suffers harm for a false negative, whereas the burden of false
positives falls squarely on the offender. Interestingly, the VCSC reports
that "[a]n error that results in diverting an offender who then reoffends
(false negative) is considered the more serious because it can endanger
public safety., 66  However, "[t]his common practice results in unfair
constraints being placed on low-risk offenders and wasted departmental
resources."
67
The problem of error brings to mind the famous assertion of William
Blackstone that "it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one
innocent suffer." 68 Nobody here is innocent in a strict sense, but there are
parallels to those who are innocent of future crimes and therefore
undeserving of punishment stemming therefrom.69 Blackstone would likely
choose a different ratio than his ten-to-one baseline, but if wrongful
punishment for past crimes uncommitted is so serious as to justify leaving
wrongdoers on the streets to endanger society, there must be a threshold
across which "wrongful" punishment for mis-predicted future crimes
becomes unpalatable, even if establishing this threshold means releasing
some wrongdoers-to-be onto the streets. Predictably, some scholars have
riposted that a moral line divides those who have been found guilty and
those who have not. 70 Otherwise, why would we not adopt pre-criminal
justice and pre-penalize our most dangerous? 7' We surely would be
64 See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
65 See MINORITY REPORT, supra note 1 (a pop-culture commentary on the perils of hidden
false negatives).
66 OSTROM ET AL., supra note 4, at 30.
67 Alex M. Holsinger et al., Practitioners' Guide to Understanding the Basis ofAssessing
Offender Risk, 65 FED. PROBATION 46, 47 (2001).
68 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *352.
69 See Alfred Blumstein et al., Delinquency Careers: Innocents, Desisters, and
Persisters, 6 CRIME & JUST. 187, 217 (1985); Tonry, supra note 39.
70 See Wilkins, supra note 5, at 35.
71 See supra note 1.
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uncomfortable using this trigger metaphor to impose lifetime imprisonment
on a first-time petty thief.
The inevitable errors of predictive punishment are quite substantial.
Even the pioneers of risk-based recidivism analysis conceded that while
their approaches were theoretically defensible, implementation was
unjustifiable using current statistical methods. As Schmidt and Witte noted:
Our levels of false positive and false negative results are high enough that it would be
very hard to justify differential treatments on the basis of our predictions at least for
more than a very small percentage of the sample .... [W]e believe that the point is
basically moot until models are developed that predict more accurately than is
currently possible.
72
Schmidt and Witte were skeptical that any more than thirty percent of
the error would ever be explainable.73 Other studies have been similarly
skeptical about error rates.74  In the National Center for State Courts'
("NCSC") review of the VCSC's approach, it found a 24.3% recidivism
rate (versus a 31.5% correct detection rate) among those scoring below the
threshold for recommended alternative sanctions.75 The peril is that false
positives are empirically incalculable because potential false positives are in
jail. But given that the false negative rate is consistent with Greenwood and
Abrahamse's rate, there is no reason to believe that the false positive rate
would not be similar, which would suggest an overall rate of error
approaching one-half.
76
Some scholars find this error even more troubling when it reflects
estimations about the future rather than misjudgments about the past,
because "[o]ffenders incorrectly predicted to commit crimes in the future
would be exposed to criminal liabilities that are doubly undeserved: once
because they were based on predictions rather than past deeds, and twice
because the predictions were inaccurate. 77  If these errors really do
72 PETER SCHMIDT & ANN DRYDEN WITTE, PREDICTING RECIDIVISM USING SURVIVAL
MODELS 5-6, 120 (1988) (finding a false positive rate of forty-seven percent and false
negative rate of twenty-eight percent).
73 Id. at 14. In fact, "statistical risk assessment devices rarely explain more than twenty
percent of the variance (i.e., differences among offenders) in criterion measures." Holsinger
et al., supra note 67, at 47.
74 See, e.g., GREENWOOD WITH ABRAHAMSE, supra note 51, at xix-xx (finding a false
positive rate of fifty-six percent and a false-negative rate of forty-six percent for their
selective incapacitation study: "As long as our ability to discriminate between high- and low-
rate offenders is imprecise, there will be legitimate concern about those who are improperly
classified."); see also Morris & Miller, supra note 1, at 5 ("[T]hat our prediction capacities
are poor[] is a regrettable truth.").
75 OSTROM ET AL., supra note 4, at 72 fig.5.13 (measuring recidivism by rearrest).
76 See supra note 74.
77 Moore, supra note 5, at 315.
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approach fifty percent, then this systemic dysfunctionality lends additional
credence to the retributive theories of punishment.
3. The Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing
Comparing the relative benefits of retributivism and utilitarianism
would be an academic exercise but for Virginia's existing fealty to
retributivism. The truth-in-sentencing reforms that directly charted the
course for risk assessment in Virginia are grounded in deserts theory.78 It
makes little sense for violent crimes to be governed by one moral baseline
and nonviolent crimes to be regulated by another.
By piloting risk-based sentencing at the same time that the governor
was preaching the importance of serving time for wrongful acts, the
Virginia legislature sent a mixed message. To be sure, there are obvious
meaningful distinctions between violent and nonviolent crimes. Also, of
course, no state has a truly consistent doctrinal formulation for its criminal
sentencing policy. However, it requires tortured logic to reconcile the two
programs. Perhaps we could characterize the whole system as utilitarian
with the added assumption that all violent acts produce criminals likely to
recidivate. Yet the consistency that this empirical assertion would require
is implausible.
The biggest problem with this conflict is that many criminals will start
their careers with non-violent offenses and will perhaps get the wrong
impression about the justice system's purpose. Instead of emphasizing
liberty and punishment for wrongful deeds, the state can appear
manipulative if the machinery of justice is seen merely as ends-driven.
4. Enforcement Effects and Circularity
A final problem with assessing current punishment based on expected
future conduct is that detection of future conduct is strongly dependent on
how we enforce the criminal code, and criminal enforcement is far from
uniform. Criminals are more likely to be caught in neighborhoods with
additional surveillance. These neighborhoods are disproportionately
populated by the economically disadvantaged and racial minorities.
We tolerate this differential enforcement because all those who are
convicted have, in fact, committed a crime, even if others have committed
the same crime undetected. However, Virginia adds a layer of complexity
78 See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 8, at 5 ("[Truth in sentencing] in deeply rooted in the
determinate sentencing philosophy that dominated the 1980s.... The determinate model is
based on a 'just deserts' philosophy .. "); see also 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at
44-45; supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
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by questioning the frequency of recidivism, which is defined as rearrest or
reconviction for any misdemeanor or felony.79 Since these later events are
also functions of enforcement, there is a feedback effect. Those who are
more likely to be caught are more likely to serve longer sentences, not just
because they are actually more likely to commit crimes, but in part because
the police are paying more attention to them. This phenomenon can falsely
make certain demographic characteristics-like age or personal
economics-appear to be more strongly correlated with crime commission
than they actually are, because younger people and poorer people are more
likely to live in areas of heavy police presence.
B. PUNISHING INDIVIDUALS FOR GROUP CHARACTERISTICS
An additional complication in any risk-based sentencing program is
the determination of factors to include in the consideration. As set out in
Figure 1, Virginia found such factors as gender, age, and past criminal
history to be relevant, but left out characteristics such as race and annual
income,80 which may in reality be correlated with recidivism. As more
distinctive characteristics are added to the model, the model becomes
theoretically more accurate, but practically more difficult to populate
because the number of people in each subgroup obviously decreases as the
number of groups increases.
The statistical approaches employed by the VCSC are not intended to
make predictions about individuals. Statistical predictions speak to group
tendencies, not individual proclivities. 8 ' To be sure, we regularly ignore
this point in the context of insurance, where individuals voluntarily assume
a standardized risk corresponding to a group statistic. But forcing convicts
to be saddled by the actions of others who are similarly aged, similarly
employed, or similarly unmarried invokes principles of equity and justice
that do not appear in the insurance context.
This Section addresses two issues. Subsection 1 considers the general
flaws of applying group-based analysis to individual members. Subsection
2 looks to specific factors that raise particular concerns because of their lack
of a relationship to the offense committed and to social norms.
79 See 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 49, 53.
80 See supra Figure 1.
81 Morris & Miller, supra note 1, at 18; James Rowland, A Review from the
Practitioner's Perspective, 1 RES. IN CORRECTIONS 47, 49 (1988).
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1. When Individuals Don't Fit the Mold
A key reason why the error rates are so large in risk assessment is that
key variables are always omitted and it is virtually impossible to distinguish
between mere correlation and true causation. Variable omission is
troubling in these contexts. This phenomenon is perhaps best explained by
example. Suppose that "amount of time spent outside the house" ("time
out" for short) is a key predictor of recidivism. Those who spend more time
at bars and clubs are more likely to become associated with a criminal
element and are more likely to commit crimes themselves. Suppose further
that the "time out" variable is difficult to measure and that nobody thought
to include it in the model. Does this mean that Virginia has merely lost
some predictive value by not incorporating the time-out variable? In
reality, the damage is considerably more extensive.
One of the variables in the Virginia model is marital status-
specifically, whether an offender has ever been married.82 It is probably
safe to assume that those who are married spend less time at bars and clubs,
so if time out is the true, but omitted, predictor, and marital status is
correlated with that variable, then marital status will show up as a
significant factor. However, it may well be that one's marital status,
considered independently, has nothing to do with criminality. There just
happen to be more single people who are out on the town. But by using the
correlated variable (marital status) instead of the true variable (time out),
those single people who do not frequent bars are encumbered with a burden
they do not deserve.
Ideally, we could establish strong relationships between predictive
variables and future criminality. Causation may be a misleading term in
this circumstance (does a previous conviction really cause you to commit
crime, or is this relationship merely a proxy for career criminality?), but the
broader issue is whether key variables have been omitted and whether this
omission raises ethical issues when employing a system where omitted
variable bias remains a problem.
Even without statistical risk assessment, however, we regularly rely on
heuristics and biases-accurate or not-to make judgments. So it may be
unfair to critique statistical risk assessment on these grounds simply
because this methodology formalizes an approach that judges apply
informally. Nonetheless, this concern signals the importance of the
variables chosen and of the thoroughness required to develop the correct set
of predictors.
82 See supra Figure 1.
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2. Which Characteristics Are Off Limits?
Even if an ideal set of predictors could be developed to accurately
assess an offender's risk of recidivism, there are some types of
characteristics that we should be wary to include. There is almost
unanimous consensus that past crimes are acceptable considerations in
punishment because of their obvious relation to criminality, culpability, and
dangerousness. So, too, do we consider the nature of the instant offense
and any showings of remorse. Just as in the Virginia model, certain crimes
are penalized more extensively when part of a conspiracy, as this
connection may signal career criminality. If a model could be crafted based
only on these criminologically-based variables, few would complain.
However, to state a broad countervailing principle, "[m]any people
believe it unjust to base punishment decisions on factors over which the
offender has no control. '83 Thus, even though violent crime is considerably
more prevalent among males 84 and some racial minorities, "[u]nalterable
characteristics such as race and sex are considered inadmissible as
predictors, and would be even if they were found to be correlated with the
frequency of serious offending., 85  Even reports advocating the use of
prediction have maintained that "[a] fair tool does not discriminate against
offenders on the basis of enduring personal traits (e.g., race, gender, or age)
and permits offenders equal access to services and treatment."
86
Any attempts to justify punishment on the basis of gender or race must
be compelling,87 because the racial and sexual dynamic of our country is
complex. It would be entirely unsatisfying to decree that male crimes were
somehow worse or that men "deserved" more time in jail than women on
the basis of gender alone. Even using the instrumental tack-that men
should be imprisoned longer because they are simply more likely to
recidivate-is painfully uncomfortable because men and women are hardly
monolithic groups. Yet in Virginia, gender is one of the most potent
determinants of prison time for nonviolent offenders.88
83 Tonry, supra note 39, at 397; accord H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 174
(1968); Moore, supra note 5, at 324.
84 Gabor, supra note 25, at 28 ("Cross-national evidence indicates that men are far more
likely to engage in criminal activity than are women and that this imbalance becomes more
pronounced with the increased gravity of criminal conduct.").
85 1 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS," supra note 5, at 166.
86 Holsinger et al., supra note 67, at 47.
87 Tonry, supra note 39, at 372.
88 See 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 60 fig.53; Nonviolent Risk Assessment
Worksheet (2006), available at http://www.vcsc.state.va.us/worksheet_2004/
DrugsSch.III Wkst.pdf (adding eight points to risk scores for male offenders).
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One way to assess the appropriateness of a predictor is to examine its
"relationship to the blameworthiness of the offender and the empirical and
logical relationship of the predictor to the behavior being predicted." 89
Under this standard, immutable characteristics like race, religion, and
gender are ethically suspect.
Even age may be an inappropriate characteristic to consider. On the
one hand, we subject juveniles to a different system of criminal justice.
However, this distinction is justifiable on the grounds that juveniles lack the
understanding of the consequences of their actions and are, optimistically
thinking, more susceptible to rehabilitation. Once criminals reach the age
of maturity, is there a valid justification for punishing younger offenders for
longer? Under the VCSC results, younger offenders are more likely to
recidivate within a short timeframe.90 Plus, age may be indicative of
omitted variables. Whereas aggregate age-specific crime commission rates
are greatest for teenagers and fall sharply thereafter, some scholars have
noted that each individual's distribution is flat, so age is merely an
inaccurate proxy for where in a criminal career an individual may be. 91
Most interesting is the issue of race. Race was the only factor
explicitly considered and rejected by the VCSC.92 As the NCSC reported,
"[a]lthough race was strongly significant in the analysis, the Sentencing
Commission viewed race 'as a proxy for social and economic
disadvantage,' and decided to exclude it from the risk assessment
worksheet." 93 The VCSC saw race as "'standing in"' for other factors,
including "economic deprivation, inadequate educational facilities, family
instability, and limited employment opportunities, many of which
disproportionately apply to the African-American population. 9 4
89 1 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS," supra note 5, at 8.
90 See 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 60 fig.53; Nonviolent Risk Assessment
Worksheet, supra note 88, at 4 (adding thirteen points for offenders under thirty years old).
91 See Chul W. Ahn et al., Estimation of Arrest Careers Using Hierarchical Stochastic
Models, 6 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 131, 133 (1990); see also MALTZ, supra note 43,
at 128 ("A covariate analysis may show, for instance, that a higher probability of recidivism
is associated with individuals who are younger at first arrest. But it cannot predict what
particular individuals will do; it can only predict, to some extent, what cohorts with different
mixes of individuals might do. Applying such findings to individuals can be improper, as
exemplified by Greenwood's (1982) reanalysis of the Chaikens' (1982) data. He showed
that those scoring higher on a crime predictor scale did, on average, have higher crime rates;
however, the percentage of cases incorrectly predicted was so high as to render the scale
useless as a prediction device.").
92 See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 4, at 26-28.
93 Id. at 12; accord 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 49.
94 OSTROM ET AL., supra note 4, at 27-28.
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This assertion raises two important questions. First, what is it about
social and economic disadvantage that makes for a uniquely unacceptable
criterion where, apparently, race alone is not per se objectionable? Second,
what steps must be taken to fully "exclude" a factor?
The VCSC has provided no further explanation about its appeal to
"social and economic disadvantage." Surely, this cannot be the true reason
for excluding race. Employment status is clearly correlated with economic
disadvantage, but it was included as a factor. Perhaps the VCSC was
merely acknowledging indirectly that race is off limits. But without
explaining its rationale more coherently, it is difficult to guess how the
VCSC distinguished between race and sex, ultimately including only the
latter. Notably, sex is correlated with social and economic disadvantage, at
least in the workplace.95
In order to truly exclude a factor from multivariate regression, it must
be included in the initial analysis and then ignored when determining the
worksheet. 96  According to the NCSC, the VCSC basically took this
approach.97 If a variable were included and ignored, then there would be
serious omitted variable problems within the results because even facially
neutral factors like education, housing, and employment vary across races. 98
But is race the only demographic variable that affects, for example,
employment prospects? Characteristics such as ethnicity and religion have
both permissible and impermissible covariates. They deserve the same
treatment as race.
C. THE POSSIBILITY OF MORAL HAZARD
An additional concern with moving away from sentencing based solely
on the severity of crimes is that doing so changes the deterrent effect on
potential first-time criminals. If older women are less likely to face serious
criminal sanctions, then standard rationality suggests that more older
women will commit crimes eligible for risk assessment.
In other words, punishment affects crime not only in the context of
recidivism, but also in the first instance of criminality. Virginia does not
appear to have studied whether this concern is legitimate. Moreover, this
circularity problem was not incorporated into the model. An assumption of
the model is that potential re-offenders make their criminal decisions
independent of the consequences. This inference simply is not true.
95 See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Women Losing Ground to Men in Widening Income
Difference, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1997, at Al.
96 See, e.g., SCHMIDT & WrITE, supra note 72, at 6.
97 See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 4, at 27-28 & n.10.
98 1 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS," supra note 5, at 167.
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A plausible counterargument to this concern is the voluntary nature of
the risk assessment program. If an offender has callously disregarded the
law because the spreadsheet recommends no jail time, then a judge would
be well-served to imprison the offender in spite of the risk-based
recommendation. But detecting such a calculation is easier said than done.
The system is designed to create different levels of punishment for different
types of people, and Homo economicus petty criminals will respond in kind
by skewing the criminality of these groups because of the moral hazard.
D. ACCOUNTING FOR THE STIGMA OF INCARCERATION
A final ethical consideration is that Virginia's risk assessment program
is being used not just to scale punishments but also to distinguish between
penalties that are different in kind. Incarceration sends a very powerful
message to society and to the inmate. 99 By and large, incarceration forever
brands an ex-convict. It suggests to potential future employers, neighbors,
and friends that the crime committed was serious enough to warrant
physical incapacitation. On the other hand, sanctions of probation are
considerably less damaging.
Is the Virginia public capable of sorting through the risk assessment
program to properly stigmatize past offenders? Or, to put it differently,
society will inevitably treat differently those who have spent their year in
the state penitentiary and those who have not. Is it appropriate if the basis
for this distinction is a prediction of future dangerousness based on group
characteristics?
The point here is that the ramifications of imprisonment are not easily
contained. While Virginia may be attempting to isolate recidivism and
minimize crime with limited resources, it is simultaneously sponsoring a
social response that diverges along the same parameters. 00 It is worth
considering whether the difference-in-kind between prison and alternative
sanctions sufficiently militates against error-prone predictive judgments that
do not bear upon the significance of an offender's past crime.
99 VON HIRSCH,supra note 16, at 110 ("The symbolism of being incarcerated compounds
its pains: it is not pleasant to live where the very walls are a reminder that one has been
singled out as a miscreant.").
1oo Cf Brian Netter, Avoiding the Shameful Backlash: Social Repercussions for the
Increased Use of Alternative Sanctions, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 190 (2005)
(arguing that when alternative sanctions attempt to capitalize on the social norms that
stigmatize criminal offenders, "the act of punishing... carries the capacity to reshape those




The above discussions highlight the ethical concerns raised by
predictive and group-based sentencing. Of course, there are also benefits.
The goal of reducing crime is substantial. But in light of the ethical
concerns, any jurisdiction seeking to impose either risk-based prediction or
demographic-based sentencing must find a considerable crime-fighting
benefit. It is difficult to quantify the costs of violating these ethical
principles, but only compelling countervailing benefits would warrant even
considering a strictly utilitarian approach.
IV. STATISTICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS
Virginia's risk assessment program is problematic even if statistically
precise, but additional questions about the methodology are equally
troubling. Given the obvious importance of accuracy, a comparison
between Virginia's approach and the statistical literature highlights some
surprising shortcomings. At the very least, these tactical blunders render
the tool less predictive; at worst, they render the program inequitable.
This Part will discuss the major methodological choices made by the
VCSC and the consequences that result therefrom. Section A revisits the
debate between risk assessment and needs assessment in the context of the
quantitative objective of the Virginia approach. Section B examines the
statistical model used to achieve this objective in light of the realities of
criminal enforcement.
A. CHOOSING THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
The stated objective of Virginia's risk assessment program is to
"predict the relative risk that a felon will become a threat to public safety"
and sentence appropriately. 01 The reference to "risk" led the VCSC to
choose "risk assessment"-where the public's safety is preeminent--over
"needs assessment"-where the offender's interests are invoked.0 2
However, these approaches need not be mutually exclusive, and the VCSC
exposes Virginians to additional risk by refusing to account for the needs of
individual offenders.
Consider Virginia's approach for developing the risk worksheet. The
VCSC developed the original model based on a study of 2013 fraud, drug,
and larceny offenders as they were released from incarceration.1°3 The
101 See VA. CODE ANN. § 17-235(5) (1995), amended by VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-803(5)
(2006).
102 See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
103 OSTROM ET AL., supra note 4, at 25.
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study examined which of these offenders was reconvicted of a felony within
a period of roughly three years. 10 4 By formulating the study in this manner,
the results suggested only the probability that an incarcerated felon
recidivates but gave no data on the rate of recidivism for offenders diverted
to alternative sanctions.
The VCSC's approach, then, was to incarcerate those felons most
likely to recidivate after their release from incarceration. This formulation
cannot be construed as effectively minimizing the rate of recidivism unless
we assume that an offender's future conduct is unaffected by the present
choice of punishment. Although "[r]adical proponents of [selective
incapacitation] regard prisons as little more than warehouses from which
inmates emerge in roughly the same shape they entered,"'' 5 the existence of
a wide variety of alternative sanctions 10 6 and Virginia's commitment to
using clinical judgment to best match a redirected offender to an
appropriate alternative sanction'0 7 indicate that Virginia believes that choice
of programs does matter. A meta-analytic study comparing risk- and need-
based punishments agrees. '
08
To be consistent with the goal of reducing risk for the population as a
whole, Virginia would need to conduct a study that examined recidivism as
a function both of personal characteristics and subsequent punishment.
This difference is not trivial. Take, for example, the case of a drug offender
eligible for risk assessment. Under the nine-point pilot, prior felony drug
convictions counted against the offender, presumably reflecting the
frequency with which drug addicts are reconvicted. 0 9  Yet thinking
qualitatively, drug offenders would appear to be among the best candidates
for alternative sanctions: if effective drug treatment programs replaced jail
104 id.
105 GABOR, supra note 25, at 5; see also GREENWOOD WITH ABRAHAMSE, supra note 51,
at vii-viii ("The most generally accepted view now is that the likelihood of an offender's
recidivism is not a function of the type of sentence he receives.").
106 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
107 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
108 See Craig Dowden & D.A. Andrews, Effective Correctional Treatment and Violent
Reoffending: A Meta-Analysis, 2000 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 449, 459-60 ("[B]ehavioral/social
learning programs were associated with substantially larger treatment effects than those
produced by non-behavioral approaches. .... The results from this study highlight the
importance of incorporating cognitive-behavioral and social learning strategies into
correctional treatment programming for violent offenders.... Clearly, multimodal treatment
approaches should ensure that ciminogenic needs are the primary focus of the intervention
to maximize their therapeutic potential.").
109 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 58.
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time, then they could contribute significantly to a drop in crime. 10 These
concerns are especially potent given the established criminogenic nature of
imprisonment."'
Another initial problem with the objective function is the definition of
recidivism. Although recidivism is susceptible to upwards of thirteen
separate definitions," 2 the binary indicator variable chosen by the VCSC-
reconviction for a felony-may not be consistent with the stated goal of
protecting the public. No felonies are "good," of course, but some are
certainly worse than others. Assessing the extent of subsequent damage as
well as the probability thereof would be appropriate if the goal were truly to
minimize social damage caused by releasing these nonviolent offenders.
B. SELECTING THE MODEL
Having discussed the initial matter of the objective, we can now
address the more fundamental questions of modeling. Both the predictive
capabilities and ethical propriety of a mathematical model depend strongly
on how accurately the model reflects the underlying process. The options
for modeling are broad. Sometimes simplistic models can accurately
represent complex phenomena; however, incorporating advanced
knowledge often requires sophisticated methodology.
The range of approaches that have been applied to recidivism is
outlined in Subsection 1. Subsection 2 looks to how the VCSC's choice of
a simple logistic regression seems inadequate, especially in light of the
NCSC's marginally more sophisticated approach that calls into question
some of Virginia's results.
1. The Science of Recidivism
A large literature exists discussing various models for recidivism. It
has been noted, however, that "the choice of technique often appears to be a
110 Incidentally, in its 2001 Annual Report, the VCSC noted that when judges exercising
their ultimate discretion changed a recommendation from alternative sanction to
incarceration, the reason was the "defendant's immersion in the drug culture" six percent of
the time. Id. at 52.
11' See Clear, supra note 53, at 28; Christina DeJong, Survival Analysis and Specific
Deterrence: Integrating Theoretical and Empirical Models of Recidivism, 35 CRIMINOLOGY
561 (1997).
12 MALTZ, supra note 43, at 63 tbl.6-1 (listing recidivism definitions used in recent
studies, including recorded police contact, new offense, severity of offense, arrest, parole
suspension, parole revocation, technical violation, absconding, probation violation, court
appearance, reconviction, sentencing, and return to prison).
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matter of convenience rather than the result of careful thought and
analysis.,,' 13
Sometimes models are robust and even the failure of some
assumptions will not render the whole approach meaningless. However,
there are considerable differences between blind statistical guesswork and
logical mathematical modeling that contextualizes the numbers. In many
respects, the story of the father of mathematical modeling, Sim6on-Denis
Poisson, is telling. In the early 1830s, Poisson and Adolphe Quetelet
studied French conviction rate statistics to evaluate Quetelet's theory that
man had an average penchant for crime that had steadily decreased through
the late 1820s.1" 4 Poisson, however, recognized that conviction rates were a
function of criminality, enforcement, and jury behavior-which was
random. 115 Thus, Poisson found that Quetelet's data were principally
explainable by stochasticity, not progress.' 16 Much can be learned from the
work of Poisson, but a key point is that mere variation does not imply
explanatory capacity.
A number of key questions must be asked in the context of recidivism.
First, does time matter, or is the key question simply whether or not a
criminal recidivates? Second, to what extent should parameters concerning
the shape of known distributions be incorporated into a model? Third, does
everyone eventually recidivate? Examining these questions in turn allows
us to highlight some of the approaches that have been introduced through
the academic literature.
a. Does Time Matter?
Virginia collected data spanning over three years that reflected not
only whether an offender recidivated but how long this process took. The
availability of this information provides a threshold question of modeling:
is it significant whether the offender is rearrested on the first day out as
opposed to after three years on the street?
If the answer to this question is "no," then the simplest regression
techniques may be appropriate. Multivariate regression is used to
determine how a set of predictors controls an end result. When the output
113 SCHMIDT & W1TTE, supra note 72, at 2.
114 Michael D. Maltz, From Poisson to the Present: Applying Operations Research to
Problems of Crime and Justice, 12 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 3, 7-10 (1996).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 9.
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data are binary, as here, logistic regression is used. To be sure, regression
is a blunt tooi and its assumptions are often violated. 17
In this context, time does matter. Not every crime is caught; adopting
Virginia's objective of minimizing the number of crimes committed, the
maximum likelihood estimate of the number of crimes an offender would
have committed while unincarcerated is the inverse of the time until
capture. 18 Thus, special emphasis must be given to those who recidivate
rapidly. When timing data are available, basic regression ignores useful
information.
b. To Parameterize or Not To Parameterize?
A variety of distributions satisfy the requirement of accounting for
time. These approaches typically employ a technique called censoring that
accounts for the possibility that an event would have happened but for the
early termination of the study. 19 This adjustment allows those times that
have been collected to be utilized.
When additional information is known about the functioning of a
random phenomenon, the phenomenon can be modeled with a particular
distribution and the parameters of that distribution can be estimated. For
example, if we knew that the time since an offender's last offense had no
bearing on the likelihood that he would offend now, we could estimate the
parameters of the exponential distribution, which shares this "memoryless"
property.
120
An approach known as Cox proportional hazards modeling obviates
this concern and has been applied on occasion to predicting recidivism.
121
The key assumption of a Cox proportional hazards model is that everyone
has a base hazard function-the likelihood of recidivating at any point in
117 See generally WILLIAM D. BERRY, UNDERSTANDING REGRESSION ASSUMPTIONS
(1993).
118 Moreover, suppose offenders commit crimes with rate Xk, where k represents the
individual offender. Let 7t be the probability a crime is detected and let "ri be the delay
time between the (i-Ost and ith crime. Then, if E[N(T)] is defined as the expected
number of crimes committed by time T, then conditioning on the first crime gives
E[N(T)] =Pr{r < T}(I+(I-zr)E[N(T-r)]). So the probability that r1 <T is
merely one multiplicative component of the function to be minimized. On quantitative
modeling of crime data more generally, see Benjamin Avi-Itzhak & Reuel Shinnar,
Quantitative Models in Crime Control, I J. CRIM. JUST. 185 (1973).
"19 See, e.g., Ann D. Witte & Peter Schmidt, An Analysis of Recidivism, Using the
Truncated Lognormal Distribution, 26 APPLIED STAT. 302, 303 (1977).
20 See, e.g., ERIC V. DENARDO, THE SCIENCE OF DECISION MAKING 362-63 (2002).
121 See, e.g., Brian D. Bunday & Victor A. Kiri, Analysis of Censored Recidivism Data
Using a Proportional Hazards-Type Model, 41 STATISTICIAN 85 (1992).
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time given that the person has not yet recidivated-and that personal
characteristics merely transform this curve by a multiplicative constant.
22
A corollary to this assumption is that hazard rates can never cross; that is,
among two people, the person who at one time is more likely to commit a
crime is always more likely to commit a crime. This approach is akin to
postulating a base rate of "stable criminality" just as Quetelet hypothesized
and Poisson disproved. 23 The problem with Cox regression is twofold.
First, if information about the distribution is known, this information must
be ignored.124 Second, the multiplicative relationship requirement is both
illogical and inconsistent with some existing data. 125 These problems have
led some scholars to conclude that "nonparametric methods like the
proportional hazards model are best regarded as useful in preliminary work
designed to select an appropriate parametric method.'
26
c. Does Everybody Recidivate?
Even among parametric survival models, there are options. Standard
survival models were developed as part of reliability theory. 27 They assess
the probability that a process will not have failed by a certain time. (In this
case, the process would be living in society and failure would be
recidivism.) The problem is that survival techniques were developed to
study electronic components. All electronics eventually fail. Is it proper to
extend this assumption to a study of recidivism? Do all criminals
eventually err again? Michael Maltz has argued that "to assume that
everyone released from a correctional program (whose purpose is to prevent
failure) will eventually fail is, at worst, unconscionable, and at best, unduly
122 See, e.g., id. at 86-87 (1992).
123 See Michael D. Maltz, Operations Research in Studying Crime and Justice: Its
History and Accomplishments, in OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR 201, 228-
29 (S.M. Pollock et al. eds., 1994).
124 See MALTZ, supra note 43, at 136.
125 Maltz, supra note 123, at 228-29; see also Christy A. Visher & R.L. Linster, A
Survival Model of Pretrial Failure, 6 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 153 (1990). But see
OSTROM ET AL., supra note 4, at 83 n.45 (finding insufficient evidence to reject the
hypothesis of proportionality). Of course, the failure to reject the assumption does not prove
its validity.
126 SCHMIDT & WrrTE, supra note 72, at 18; see also MALTZ, supra note 43, at 72
("Without [the multiplicative constant] assumption the results are of little utility.").




pessimistic." 128 The truth is that some offenders will successfully desist
from future wrongful behavior.'
29
Desistance can be incorporated by adding an additional parameter
representing the binary outcome of whether or not an individual will
recidivate. These models, called "split" or "incomplete" distributions, have
been applied successfully to recidivism data. 130 Recognizing the Poisson
distribution for crimes committed by released criminals who do recidivate,
a split distribution can be modeled as exponential (where recidivism is
defined by arrest) or lognormal (where recidivism is defined by
conviction). 131 One study comparing split models to basic models (like
linear or exponential regression) found that "the worst of [the] split models
(the split exponential) was about as good as the best of the simple models
(the LaGuerre)."'
132
2. Models Used for Virginia
With the well-developed literature on survival techniques and
incomplete distributions, it is a bit surprising that the VCSC settled on
logistic regression to model crime in Virginia, both in the original 1995-96
study and the 2001 validation. 133  Survival models, apparently with
inevitable recidivism assumed, were considered and rejected both times.
134
In the interim, the NCSC's evaluation study employed Kaplan-Meier
survival analysis and Cox proportionality regression. 135  Both models
account for the time of an offense-unlike the VCSC-but both approaches
are nonparametric. Still, for the reasons discussed above, a survival
approach is more meaningful to the process of recidivism than blind
snapshot regression.' 
36
It would be helpful to reevaluate the VCSC and NCSC data using
incomplete parametric distributions, but the data are not publicly available.
128 MALTZ, supra note 43, at 89.
129 See generally Blumstein et al., supra note 69 (studying whether juveniles can
properly be categorized as "innocents" who will not commit a crime, "desisters" who are
likely to commit only one or two crimes, and "persisters" who are highly likely to
recidivate).
130 See, e.g., JOHN E. ROLPH ET AL., METHODS FOR ESTIMATING CRIME RATES OF
INDIVIDUALS (1981); Maltz, supra note 123, at 226-28.
131 To be precise, Rolph et al. settled on a logit-lognormal distribution, which is logistic
on the binary variable and lognormal on the others. See ROLPH ET AL., supra note 130, at 82.
132 Id. at 81.
133 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 55 fig.49.
114 Id. at 57 & fig.5 1.
135 See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 4, at 65.
136 See supra Part IV.B. L.a.
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Still, comparing the VCSC and NCSC conclusions bears on the ethical
issues discussed earlier. 37 Notably, the NCSC remarked that:
Both types of survival analysis (Kaplan-Meier and Cox regression), for both measures
of recidivism [(rearrest and reconviction)], produced very consistent results about
which factors were "good" predictors of recidivism. The results indicated that only
gender and factors related to prior record were useful for predicting
recidivism.... None of the other factors on the worksheet were significant predictors
of risk. This included the other demographic factors (employment status, marital
status, and age of offender) and contemporaneous factors (offender alone and
additional offenses at time of offense).
138
After the NCSC report, the VCSC used different data to reevaluate its
own use of demographic variables. Returning to its logistic regression
models, the VCSC ran two models: one including age, marital status, and
employment (Model 1); the other without (Model 2). 13 9 The commission
found that Model 2 actually produced nonrecidivists with greater accuracy
but that Model 1 produced a lower recidivism rate for those recommended
for alternative sanctions.14
0
But this result was inevitable. If the models were designed to
minimize recidivism, then Model 1 could perform no worse than Model 2
because Model 2's variables comprise a subset of Model l's. The more
important question is the extent of the significance here. Given the obvious
ethical concerns about using demographic data, can Virginia possibly
satisfy the threshold of substantiality? The answer is a resounding "no."
There are sizable social costs associated with sentencing offenders on the
basis of demographic characteristics. Double-penalizing the unemployed
for their plight is heartless, and imprisoning offenders because they lack a
spouse to come home to bears little relationship to the purposes of
incarceration.
137 See supra Part III.
138 OSTROM ET AL., supra note 4, at 91.
139 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 58 fig.52.
140 Id. at 57 fig.51. This result is nonsensical and violates Bayes's Theorem. As the
statistics were given, 75.7% of nonrecidivists were accurately predicted by Model I and
76.6% by Model 2. This outcome can only refer to the probability of nonrecidivism given a
point score in the lowest quartile (i.e., the grouping recommended for diversion). The only
alternative would be the probability that a nonrecidivist were selected for diversion, the
complement of false negatives. But the data render such an option impossible, because with
overall recidivism hovering around one-third, identifying three-quarters of the nonrecidivists
would necessitate identifying far more than one-quarter of the offenders. If this figure
represents the probability of recidivism given diversion, then the second datum, the
recidivism rate for offenders recoiimmended for alternative sanctions, should be
complementary. But the VCSC claimed that 12.4% of those diverted from Model 1
recidivate versus 14.5% in Model 2. Id. The dichotomous inconsistency is impossible if
both models fixed a twenty-five point threshold.
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Supporters of statistical risk assessment would question whether a
judge, acting alone, could do any better. There are two responses. First, it
is socially acceptable to analytically study the future behavior of offenders
who commit certain crimes, who have certain criminal histories, or whose
crimes included certain characteristics. However, marginal improvements
that can be gained by adding demographic considerations must be balanced
against the sizable equitable costs of imposing such a regime. There is a
risk in detaching punishment from the punishable act. There is a risk in
segmenting the population into these predictive groups. And there is the
risk of false positives. To be sure, there will always be false positives, and
jail time will frequently be served by those who pose little or no threat to
society. But that penalty is justifiable only if it can be tied to the initial act
and state retribution. Paying a penalty justified only by an immutable
personal characteristic runs counter to nationwide trends in equity and
imposes serious societal costs that Virginia has simply neglected.
Given the very small improvement produced by incorporating the four
minor demographic factors in the validation study, Virginia would be well-
served to revisit the model and omit them. Raw efficiency is not the only
objective served by our correctional system, and the VCSC's current
approach damages the integrity of criminal justice for Virginians.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Although effective criminal sentencing is a noble goal, we must be
mindful that our tactics have collateral consequences. The Virginia risk
assessment program may not appear dramatic, but its assumptions reflect a
monumental change in how criminals are sentenced yet the program has
been implemented with perilously little public discussion. While statistical
methodology may not be appropriate fodder for public discourse, the
fundamental basis for correctional judgments is not insubstantial. The
equity concerns raised by predictive judgments that utilize demographic
characteristics of dubious significance are worthy of discussions in both
academic and political circles.
A review of the reports and the Virginia data should leave us
unconvinced that Virginia has adopted an appropriate procedure for
sentencing its nonviolent criminals. The Commonwealth has not met its
burden to justify this new approach. In the end, perhaps sentencing extends
the baseball analogy adopted by the Chief Justice at his confirmation
hearings: judges should call the balls and the strikes.141 In baseball, purists
have long fought using cameras to review umpire's decisions, with no
141 See Quotation of the Day, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005, at A2.
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better reasoning than tradition. Here, there are strong reasons of substance
to support vesting sentencing discretion in judges. Even if their sentencing
is ultimately less efficient, it can, at the very least, limit our considerations
to factors related to the crime we deem deserving of punishment.
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